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Theology of Giving as Comprehensive Lutheran Theology 
 
Risto Saarinen 
 
The Lutheran Reformation was born from controversies around the problematic practices 
of the Western church in Luther’s times. Lutheran confessional writings reflect the 
outcome of these controversies. This well-known state of affairs means that Lutherans do 
not possess a comprehensive body of theological doctrine, as the normative Book of 
Concord remains eclectic. The Lutheran doctrines of justification, the Word of God and the 
sacraments clearly belong to the core of normative doctrine, but many other theological 
teachings are only very rudimentarily treated in the Book of Concord. Over the centuries, 
Lutheran theologians have developed strategies to overcome this deficit. These strategies 
can be understood as a continuous quest for the missing parts of doctrine. My own road 
map in this quest can be labeled as »theology of giving«, a strategy which aims at reaching 
a comprehensive picture of doctrinal theology from the perspective of one prominent and 
pluriform theological concept.
1
 
    In the following, I will first outline some strategies of constructing systematic doctrine, 
connecting them with the current theological discussion on giving and the gift. Then I 
proceed to the so-called »giver-oriented perspective« and the broader semantics and 
epistemology of »give« and »receive«. After this I can provide a model of comprehensive 
doctrine, formulated in terms of giving. Finally, I will discuss the ultimate conceptual 
horizon, the so-called »transcendentals«, of this comprehensive Lutheran theology. 
 
 
I. Strategies of Doctrine and Theology of Giving 
 
     One popular strategy is to maintain that the doctrine of justification, properly 
understood, contains everything; it constitutes the criterion of all other doctrines and 
everything else can be derived from this doctrine. The problems of this approach are 
obvious: it would be strange to claim, for instance, that the Nicean doctrine of the Trinity 
could be derived from the Lutheran doctrine of justification.
2
 
    Another and in many ways more promising strategy consists in claiming that Lutherans 
should only take their distinctive doctrines from the Lutheran confessions; in all other 
doctrinal matters they should follow the biblical, patristic and medieval Christian teaching. 
While this strategy is often applied in the ecumenical dialogues of the Lutheran churches, it 
also contains some problems. Dogmatic ecclesiology, for instance, was not developed 
before the Reformation. In order to compare Lutheran and Roman Catholic ecclesiologies, 
one needs to turn to the post-Reformation developments. 
    A third strategy would complement the second one through paying attention to early 
modern, Enlightenment and late modern doctrinal developments, claming that Lutherans 
need to relate their doctrine to modern developments. The problems of this strategy are 
found in the growing plurality of doctrines and their relative lack of normativity. There are 
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simply too many opinions and teachings available in order to establish one coherent body 
of normative doctrine. 
    A fourth stragegy maintains that the missing parts are nevertheless inherently present in 
the historical body of doctrine, even when the explicit doctrine remains rudimentary. 
Although the Lutheran confessions do not contain an elaborate doctrine of God or the 
Trinity, we can nevertheless extract this doctrine through a close reading of relevant texts. 
The themes available in the text can be amplified so that a comprehensive body of doctrine 
emerges. In this manner, some central ideas or motifs available in the normative texts are 
like the stem cells in human body: they are pluripotent, that is, they can become different 
kinds of organs and members of the comprehensive body. 
      The fourth strategy is common in 20th-century theology. In reading the standard 
monographs of Luther’s theology by Paul Althaus or Gerhard Ebeling, for instance, we can 
detect the influence of this strategy.
3
 Its problem is that many different comprehensive 
theologies can emerge from the same body of historical texts. The historical texts 
underdetermine the doctrine; in other words, some extra-textual, additional systematic 
principles are needed to complement the historical picture. 
     My own way of formulating a comprehensive Lutheran theology consists of a mixture 
of the second and the fourth strategy. There are some thematic cores in the historical 
sources which allow us to draw a great number of doctrinal conclusions. In order to do this, 
the thematic cores should be amplified partly by referring to earlier history, partly through 
employing systematic tools of analysis. In an ideal case, these two auxiliaries come 
together so that the systematic tool can be claimed to have been available in the sixteenth 
century. Its historical availability makes its use more plausible: the tool is not merely a 
modern invention, but something that was already present in the world of the text.  
    The concept of giving exemplifies the above-mentioned ideal case: on the one hand, a 
contemporary analysis of these concepts allows to see a number of systematic connections 
between different theological themes of the Reformation. On the other hand, it is often also 
possible to argue that the philosophy of gift, generosity and giving was available for the 
Reformers through various ancient sources, most notably through Seneca and Augustine.
4
 
The systematic connections thus have a historical plausibility, although the connections are 
here and now outlined in a systematic fashion. Through a systematic amplification of the 
notions of gift and giving, a comprehensive outline of Lutheran theology is attempted. 
      This project belongs to a greater current of new thinking about the gift. At least since 
the 1980s, we can observe two distinct, although nowadays interrelated academic 
discussions on the theological significance of the gift. The central figure of the first 
discussion is the French Catholic philosopher Jean-Luc Marion. In many books he has 
outlined a phenomenological view of reality which appears to us in terms of givenness and, 
finally, donation.
5
 In his discussion with philosophers like Jacques Derrida and theologians 
like John Milbank Marion has claimed that it is possible to solve the old paradoxes related 
to »free gifts« when we meditate the phenomenon of giving something anonymously to an 
enemy. In Marion's paradigm of gift-giving the economic interests of the giver and the 
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recipient can be counteracted so that an idea of disinterested giving emerges. As this 
paradigm is obviously relevant to the ideals of giving expressed by Jesus in the New 
Testament, Marion's phenomenological analysis of giving has prompted much recent 
discussion especially in Catholic theology.
6
 
     In addition to Marion's approach, there exists a significant new discussion on the gift 
in Lutheran theology. It was initiated in the 1980s by three Luther scholars, namely, Martin 
Seils, Oswald Bayer and Tuomo Mannermaa. In his keynote address in the World Congress 
for Luther Research in Erfurt 1983, Martin Seils interpreted »Luther's Cause« in terms of a 
consistent theology of giving.  For Seils, this interpretation is primarily a historical 
observation which gives Luther's theology its distinctive systematic structure.
7
 Already in 
1981, Oswald Bayer  elaborated the topic of of »categorical gift« as a basic theme of 
Lutheran theology.
8
 According to Bayer, Lutheran ethics should not proceed from 
categorical imperative but from God's unconditional gift which contains the plenitude and 
excess which forms the basis of the freedom of the Christian.  Bayer's numerous 
elaborations on the categorical gift and the freedom it constitutes can in many ways be 
regarded as a Protestant counterpart to Marion's wrestling with givenness and donation.
9
 
      Tuomo Mannermaa pays attention to the presence of Christ in the faith of a 
Christian.
10
 Luther often expresses this presence in terms of a gift, donum. For Mannermaa, 
this presence of the personal gift means that Luther's theology is »realistic« or »real-ontic« 
in its basic character. While in Marion's phenomenology the understanding of reality as 
donation means that God is not »being« in any metaphysical sense, Mannermaa wants to 
bring about an ontological reinterpretation of Protestant theology. Without denying the 
different approaches of the two authors, the final difference between Mannermaa and 
Marion may nevertheless be nominal rather than real. They both aim at making room for a 
meaningful concept of God so that the discussion between philosophy and theology can 
proceed in new and fruitful ways. In this sense both Mannermaa and Marion aim at 
liberating the theological concept of God's gift from the inner-religious ghetto of 
modernity. Although Mannermaa, like Seils, understands his study of Luther as historical 
interpretation, he finally aims at reaching a broader systematic concept of theological 
ontology.
11
  
     In contemporary Scandinavian theology, the elaboration of the gift has on the one 
hand taken place among Mannermaa's Finnish students, including myself, on the other 
hand in the extensive work of Bo Kristian Holm and Jan-Olav Henriksen. Bo Holm has 
connected the two above-mentioned discussions, claiming that the Lutheran discussion can 
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also learn about the broader sociological and anthropological elaborations of the gift.
12
 
Jan-Olav Henriksen has linked the two discussions with Christology and postmodernity, 
arguing that the experiential reality can be understood as a certain type of givenness in 
which »everything is gift«.
13
 
 
 
II. The Giver-Oriented Perspective and Its Epistemology 
 
    The so-called »giver-oriented perspective«
14
 allows us a new insight to the complex 
nature or human freedom, as it has been discussed in doctrinal theology. Western theology 
has traditionally formulated its doctrines concerning the human reception of God's gifts 
from the perspective of the recipient, discussing extensively the limits of human freedom in 
appropriating this gift. In this discussion it has often been considered more adequate and 
more valuable to minimize human freedom, so that Augustine is considered more orthodox 
than Pelagius, Luther more orthodox than Erasmus and Calvin more orthodox than 
Arminius. But if in this discussion the recipient's activity is always minimized, he or she is 
no longer regarded as personal subject, but only as an addressee which can receive in an 
inanimate fashion, like the mailbox receives a letter. The anti-Pelagian strive of Western 
theology thus constantly threatens to downgrade the recipient so that he or she is nothing 
more than an inanimate container into which the »gift« is put.
15
 
     But if we use the view of God as giver and call the »thing« God gives a gift, then it 
follows that the recipient needs to be animate. For the linguistic constructions of which 
»give« is a constituent depict a transfer between two persons: I give this book to you, but I 
put the book into a bookshelf. A giver-oriented perspective pays attention to this basic 
linguistic fact, arguing that the minimizing of the activity of the recipient has a certain limit 
beyond which we cannot proceed without losing completely the vocabulary of giving and 
the gift.
16
 
     The meaning of »receive« thus needs to be understood from the perspective of »give«. 
We may compare this requirement with the practise of taking photos of timid objects: if we 
point at them directly, they do no appear natural; but if we point the camera to a mirror 
which indirectly shows the timid object, we may achieve a better result. This argument is to 
some extent puzzling, since it actually claims that we can understand the meaning of the 
verb »receive« better when we look at it from the perspective of another verb, namely, 
»give«. How can this be? Isn't it strange and counterintuitive to claim that a word can be 
properly understood only by looking at it from the angle of another word? 
     In his extensive linguistic study of the verb »give«, John Newman explains this 
phenomenon as follows: »... we can assume an identical base for both receive and give. 
With receive, however, only part of that base is profiled: the one involving the interaction 
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of the 'recipient' and the 'thing'.« For Newman, the complete semantical base of these two 
verbs involves the giver, the thing and the recipient and their interaction in the process in 
which the thing is transferred from the giver to the recipient. Although the initiating part of 
this base is not profiled in the verb receive, Newman concludes that »it is still the case that 
the 'giver' initiates the whole process, of course.«
17
 
     If we believe Newman's linguistic explanation, we can argue that the analysis which 
employs the verb »give« as its starting-point is likely to achieve better results than the 
analysis proceeding from »receive«. »Receive« only illuminates a part of the semantical 
base which is at stake when the above-mentioned process of transfer is concerned. While 
both »give« and »receive« depict the same process,  »receive« only captures a part of that 
process. Therefore, a giver-oriented perspective is more adequate to grasp the whole 
process.  Some idiomatic usages support this conclusion. In English, for instance, 
»receive« can be used so that the »receiver« need not be person but it can be something 
inanimate, like a radio or a mailbox.
18
  Such inanimate uses of »receive« may contribute to 
the downgrading of the activity of the animate recipient. 
     Newman's explanation can, therefore, indirectly support a theological view in which 
the phenomenon of »giving« has a perspectival priority over the phenomenon of 
»receiving«. This is important, since so many modern discussions on theological 
epistemology are concerned with the conflict between »Kantian« and »Barthian« modes of 
doing theology. According to »Kantianism«, we need to focus on the anthropological 
preconditions of receiving knowledge, while in »Barthianism« we give God's 
self-revelation a priority over all anthropological considerations. The linguistic priority of 
»giving« over »receiving« lends at least some support to the view of »Barthianism«.
19
 
Without connecting the »giver-oriented perspective« with the entire programme of 
Barthianism,  we need to look at the problem of human reception from the perspective of 
giving rather than receiving. This decision does not solve all difficult problems of 
theological epistemology, but it pays attention to the fact that the vocabulary of giving has 
a broader semantic and epistemic profile than the vocabulary of receiving. This linguistic 
fact thus serves as epistemic justification of the giver-oriented perspective in theology. 
    The fascinating theological consideration which the giver-oriented perspective offers is 
the following: can it be that so much of Western theological reflection has been misguided 
in its orientation towards receiving rather than giving, or anthropological preconditions 
rather than God's donative self-revelation? If Western theology had focused on the 
phenomenology of giving, it would have been able to employ the whole semantic profile of 
the transfer of a thing from a giver to the recipient. Eastern Christian theology has fared 
better in this respect. Its elaboration of human freedom has not proceeded from the free 
decision of the will, but rather from the distinction between the different capacities 
(exousia) of humans, animals and inanimate objects. At least since Origen the Eastern 
theology has considered humans (and, to a lesser extent, other animals) in terms of 
autexousion, self-control, and aph heauton, self-movement. These features have 
distinguished humans from lower animals and inanimate objects.
20
 The vocabulary of 
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self-control and self-movement underlines the animate character of humans irrespectively 
of whether they appear as givers or recipients, as agents or patients. This vocabulary is, 
therefore, better compatible with the entire semantic basis of giving and receiving than the 
Latin anti-Pelagian vocabulary. In particular, the Eastern vocabulary allows humans to 
appear as animate persons in the position of recipient and patient. Therefore, the Eastern 
vocabulary can express the freedom of persons without the danger of Pelagianism. 
 
 
III. Giving as the Seed of Comprehensive Doctrine 
 
Let us now return to the strategy of developing doctrine through the method of growing 
them from the seeds, or, to use a contemporary picture, the pluripotent stem cells available 
in the theology of giving. Our point of departure, the principium, is the undifferentiated 
verb »give«. All particular and narrower meanings of giving proceed or emerge from this 
origin. The emergence of meanings streches to two different directions. There is, first, the 
direction of »give and take«, or the »economic« wing of giving. These meanings involve 
strong reciprocity and the balancing of accounts; the »recipient« does not appear so much 
as patient as someone who in turn becomes an agent; conversely, the giver receives 
something in this reciprocity. 
    Second, there is the direction of »give and receive«, or the »donative« wing of giving. 
These meanings only involve a weak reciprocity; they underline the monergic nature of 
giving. The recipient appears as patient to whom one can say: »what do you have that you 
have not received« (1. Cor. 4:7), meaning that the process of reception is not active but the 
act of accipere takes place as a passive reception of the gift.
21
 In the act of donative giving, 
the giver does not appear as recipient; there is no economy of give and take, but a monergy 
of giving. This monergy need not, however, downgrade the recipient into an inanimate 
addressee. The recipient can express gratitude and become empowered by the gift received. 
     The philosophical and sociological discussion on gift-giving has to a large extent 
focused on the theoretical possibility of »free« or » completely disinterested« practises of 
gift-giving.
22
 In terms of my model, such possibilities would exemplify extremely donative 
variants of giving. My suggestion is, however, that the so-called pure gift or, in Oswald 
Bayer's terms, the »categorical gift« is found in the middle ground between complete 
economy and extreme donation. Speaking in this manner, a »pure gift« need not be entirely 
donative or monergic, but it can be manifest both the unconditional attitude of the giver 
and the genuine freedom of the recipient. While this definition of pure gift clearly differs 
from the approaches of Derrida and Marion, it may be consonant with Bayer's elaboration 
of the categorical gift. It may also resemble some elaborations of Milbank and Holm 
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concerned with the so-called »purified gift-exchange«.
23
 At this point, however, my own 
concern is not so much the relationship to other models but the inner consistence of this 
outline of theological giving.  
     I am presupposing that »give« is a basic verb in many languages
24
, including the 
biblical languages and that in these languages many other meanings are derived from the 
undifferentiated and pluripotent »give«. Concerning the New Testament Greek in 
particular, I assume that when the verb didômi receives meanings like paradidômi »hand 
out«, it grows towards economical reciprocity. The verb »send« accompanies »give« in its 
donative wing of extended meanings. Thus verbs like the Greek aphiêmi and the Latin 
remitto, »send away, forgive« can be understood as donative extensions of giving.
25
 A 
particularly complex chain of meanings is attached to verbs which describe teaching. On 
the one hand, the handing out of tradition (Greek: paradosis, Latin: traditio) is clearly 
reciprocical and in some sense economic: the gift is also a task which is to be handed out 
by means of new teaching of the same tradition. On the other hand, the teaching involved 
in proclamation and witness need to be understood in terms of donation: the listeners 
receive a gift which is not meant to impose immediate duties and tasks on them. Witness 
and proclamation thus exemplify donative modes of teaching. 
        To make visible the parallels between the economic and donative modes of same 
kinds of gift-events, such as teaching, I use the level of differentiation from 
undifferentiated »give« to the pure event of »categorical giving«. This methods yields a 
two-dimensional matrix of giving: while the poles of economy and donation define the 
horizontal dimension, the differentiation from basic »give« towards »categorical giving« 
constitutes the vertical dimension. The matrix thus appears as follows: 
 
          »give-and-take«        »give-and-receive«                                                
     give (didomi) 
       giving to  send (away) 
   hand over (paradidomi)                 
witness 
              bribe,                 release    
tradition (paradosis)                       payment 
          forgive 
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   deliverance      gift 
             teaching 
                             atonement (justice,               righteousness)
 receiving grace, mercy          
             
       giving for   giving an example 
      beneficial giving  
     sacrifice               hospitality, generosity 
         help, aid 
                   
 
pure gift 
      categorical giving 
          love   
                 ECONOMY                                                          
DONATION 
______________________________________________________________________        
Figure 1: varieties of theological giving 
Figure 1: Varieties of Theological Giving 
 
 
 
 
     The matrix allows us to distinguish between economic and donative variants of 
theological giving. The different variants are not, as a rule, »pure« but they contain both 
donative and economic aspects. Atonement and redemption, for instance, only make sense 
if we understand them in terms of some kind of reciprocity and even as »payments«. This is 
also true of justice and righteousness: justice needs pay attention to some kind of balancing 
the accounts between the agent and the addressee, the giver and the recipient of harms and 
benefits. At the same time Christian theology emphatically teaches that atonement, 
redemption and justice should not be understood as completely separated from grace and 
forgiveness. In order to be Christian notions, these theological concepts need to contain the 
reality of that gift which God gives in the merciful turning towards humans. Although 
atonement and redemption belong to the »economic« variants of theological giving, they 
also point towards the donative aspects of divine mystery. 
     The matrix attempts to illuminate how two different concepts, donation and economy, 
can nevertheless be »twins« in the sense that they in many cases manifest the same vertical 
depth of giving. The act of handing over the tradition, for instance, presupposes a complex 
economic network of reciprocity.  The proclamation of the word in witness and teaching, 
on the other hand, exemplifies a relatively »pure« act of donation: I can teach many people 
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without losing myself the knowledge I am transferring to them. In this sense, teaching can 
be a donative horn of plenty which is multiplied beyond measure. And yet, both the 
economic handing over of tradition and the donative, unilateral proclamation manifest the 
phenomenon of teaching. The same or at least similar phenomenon can proceed in both 
economic and donative variants. 
     When the vertical depth increases, the matrix proceeds towards that pure gift or 
categorical giving which contains both economic and donative purposes. While the 
undifferentiated »give« first exemplifies the concrete act of »giving to«, the deeper variants 
of giving are interpreted as instances of »giving for«, that is, acts which highlight the 
intention and the purpose of the act performed.
26
 Thus pure gift and categorical giving are 
not exemplary in their economical or donative nature, but their purity is found in the clarity 
and depth of their intention and purpose. »The gift« appears in the middle of vertical depth, 
as it contains both the concrete act of giving to and the intention. In order to be a gift, the 
thing given needs an intention of the giver, otherwise the recipient cannot distinguish it 
from other, externally similar transactions. But the concrete handing out of the thing is also 
important: we do not say, for instance, to our children in Christmas that you only receive 
my good will. The essence of the gift is to be situated in the middle of the matrix, 
representing both economy and donation, both the concrete act and its deeper purpose. 
     Among the deeper teleological variants of »giving for«, one can identify the 
phenomenon of sacrifice. Sacrifices belong typically to the so-called »tritransitive« acts in 
which the agent exercises an influence upon three objects: the thing or gift given, the 
recipient and the beneficiary. Because of this tritransitive structure, the purposes of »giving 
for« are particularly important in sacrificial acts. At the same time, sacrifices presuppose 
some kind of economy: by giving something to a recipient, the agent wants to obtain a 
reward for the beneficiaries concerned. But sacrifices are also donative, since the agent 
gives a gift without necessarily obtaining a reward for himself or herself. Sacrifices thus 
appear fairly close to the end point of the matrix, the pure gift. They do not, however, 
represent pure gift or categorical giving as such, since the clarity of the agent's intention 
may not reach the ideal. It can be asked, though, whether divine sacrificial act, such as the 
Father's giving of the Son for our salvation, reach this clarity, thus becoming an instance of 
categorical giving. 
     Hospitality and long-term aid also exemplify such acts of »giving for« in which the 
clarity of intention and purpose are highlighted. They are primarily donative acts of giving, 
but some economical reciprocity also belongs to the picture. While in aid programs the aid 
is given unilaterally, the manifold and complex considerations of the recipients are also 
important: it is not only the need of the recipients, but their human dignity and their 
responsibility as partners which are being discussed in the planning of aid programs. Acts 
of hospitality are likewise primarily donative and secondarily economic: the giver needs to 
act generously, but also with due consideration, and the recipient is at least tacitly called to 
return the favors in some way. Human acts of help and hospitality thus approach the end 
point of pure gift, but they cannot reach the utmost clarity of intention and purpose needed 
in it. It can be asked, though, whether donative divine acts, such as the forgiveness of sins 
or the self-giving of the Son in the eucharist, reach this clarity, thus becoming instances of 
categorical giving. 
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     It is difficult to discuss the nature of pure gift and categorical giving much closer. I  
use the concept of love to depict this nature: love is both economic and donative, love is 
meant to manifest the depths of both »give-and-take« and »give-and-receive«. The matrix 
primarily illuminates the emergence of different kinds of doctrines from the 
undifferentiated act of giving. We can see how different themes or loci of Christian 
doctrine grow organically from this act. There need not be anything particularly Lutheran in 
this process, but since many authors claim that Lutheran theology is fundamentally 
concerned with the issues of giving and the gift, Lutheran doctrine can at least be regarded 
as compatible with this matrix. While Lutheran theology may feel more at home in the 
donative wing of the matrix, it is also essential to claim that the gift contains the possibility 
of both economic and donative extensions.  
     If there is anything non-standard or innovative in the matrix, it is the position of the 
pure gift in the end point of »giving for«. While philosophical and theological discussion 
on the pure gift have tended to establish this ideal as the extreme end of donative reality, 
my matrix situates it in that far end of the conceptual realm in which the utmost clarity of 
intention and purpose elevates the gift beyond economic and donative considerations. The 
ideal of categorical giving is thus characterised by the excess and depth of purpose rather 
than by the excess of economic wealth or donative generosity. »Love« is a category which 
manifests this clarity, depth and excess of purpose beyond the economic and donative 
relationships which accompany it. 
 
 
IV. Truth and Love as the »Transcendentals« of Doctrine 
 
In some more speculative branches of Catholic theology, the so-called »transcendentals« 
are extensively discussed. In their pre-Kantian metaphysical guise, the transcendentals refer 
to those most common notions which are found beyond the categorical organisation of 
language. Being, oneness, truth, goodness and beauty are the most prominent 
transcendentals discussed in this manner.
27
 As being, truth and goodness/love also 
correspond to the biblical definitions of God, these transcendentals have high relevance for 
the interpretation of the world in terms of theological metaphysics or ontology. If 
theological doctrines are interpreted in ontological terms, the transcendentals offer a 
possibility to construct a metaphysical framework for the doctrinal development. 
      I am not proposing that a comprehensive understanding of doctrine inevitably needs 
the old view of transcendentals. Linguistic understandings of doctrine may be fully 
sufficient and provide fruitful ways of grasping the content of Christianity.
28
 While some 
Lutheran theologians, most notably Wolfhart Pannenberg and Paul Tillich
29
, have 
attempted a metaphysical grounding of doctrine, others have consciously avoided this task. 
I will argue, however, that the transcendentals of truth and goodness/love offer a possibility 
to connect the theology of giving with metaphysical considerations. As these two 
transcendentals are also prominent biblical attributes of the trinitarian God (John 14:6 and 
15:26; 1 John 4:6-8 and 5:6), we may employ them as theological coordinates of talk about 
God the Giver. 
                                                          
27
 For the history of transcendentals, see JAN AERTSEN et al., Transzendental, in: 
Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 10, 1358-1436. 
28
 This line is developed in SAARINEN, The Language. 
29
 For their theology as part of this tradition, see e.g. W. SCHÜSSLER & B. 
HERBECK-PINGEL, Transzendenz, in: Theologische Realenzyklopädie 33, 768-775.  
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     To illustrate the transcendentals of truth and love, I will use another figure with two 
dimensions, the horizontal proceeding towards truth and the vertical towards goodness or 
love. On the horizontal level, the opposite of truth is »indifference of truth«. One needs to 
add that the notion of »indifference« does not mean »lying« or »falsehood«, but simply that 
the transcendental value of truth grows from zero (indifference) towards the maximal value 
(truth). The two poles are also described with the acts of remembering (truth) and 
forgetting (indifference).  In the vertical axis, the upper end is goodness or love, while the 
lower end denotes indifference to goodness and love. I will also use the vertical scale for 
the understanding of giving. While positive giving and donating are connected with 
goodness and love, the indifference to goodness or love is characterized as renunciation, 
deletion and sending away. Such phenomena of »negative giving« need not be bad or 
sinful; it is only meant that the acts of taking away and renouncing do not depict positive 
goodness or love in the same manner as the positive acts of giving and donation. While an 
act of renunciation may indirectly promote some goodness, its basic content does not 
connotate love and goodness in the same way as the acts of positive giving. In this sense 
we may speak of a relative indifference to goodness and love as the lower end of the 
vertical scale. 
     The connection between goodness/love and positive giving needs some elaboration in 
order to be properly understood. In his semantic study of »give« John Newman argues that 
the literal meaning of »give« very often involves and connotates some beneficial effect on 
the recipient. If I give something to you, you are normally thought to benefit from this act 
of giving. Although there are counterexamples, the normal and literal meaning of »give« 
makes the recipient in some sense also a beneficiary.
30
 If this linguistic and semantic 
observation is elevated on the metaphysical level, one can argue that the act of giving 
normally moves on the transcendental scale of benefiting the recipient. The act of love is 
similar in this respect: if somebody is loved, the recipient of love is normally supposed to 
enjoy and benefit from this act of love. Phenomenologists argue that the question: does 
anyone out there love me?, forms the starting-point of the reflection on love.
31
 Christian 
love is often conceptualized in terms of gift-love: agape is supposed to bestow a divine gift 
upon the recipient. Although these connections by no means establish a full-fledged 
synonymy between the phenomena of love, giving and goodness, there is a family 
resemblance which allows to draw the vertical line of goodness, love and giving.  
     Thus we obtain a two-dimensional matrix in which the horizontal line, depicting the 
transcendental of truth, stretches from forgetting towards remembering. The vertical line 
proceeds from the lower end of indifference and renunciation towards the upper end of 
positive giving, love and goodness. While the point of departure, the origo, characterizes an 
undifferentiated existence in half-truth and half-goodness, the upper right corner of the 
matrix depicts the positive existence in truth and love. When we describe Christian 
existence in light of these transcendentals, we may begin with an observation which is 
characteristically Lutheran: the way towards existence in love and truth starts with 
proceeding in the opposite direction, towards the lower left corner of renunciation and 
forgetting. This is because the forgiveness of sins is biblically characterized as »sending 
away« the sins, or as release and liberation, or, sometimes, as cleansing.
32
 In all these acts, 
                                                          
30
 So NEWMAN, Give, 52. See in more detail SAARINEN, The Language. 
31
  See JEAN-LUC MARION, The Erotic Phenomenon, Chicago 2007; JEANROND, 
Theology of Love, 155-161. 
32
 This is argued in more detail in SAARINEN, God and the Gift, 59-79 and SAARINEN, 
Forgiveness, the Gift and Ecclesiology, Dialog 45, 2006, 55-62. For the biblical notion of 
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forgiveness starts with some kind of negative giving or sending away and with a relative 
forgetting or non-recognition of the existing sins. 
      The quest for love and truth thus starts with turning one's back to these 
transcendentals. Conversion, repentance and recognition that the secret of life is hidden 
under the opposite are needed. The quest for truth and love needs to start with a recognition 
of the paradox of our existence. At the same time it needs to be stated, however, that the 
real quest only starts from the lower left end of the matrix. The journey of repentance and 
conversion, leading to the point of forgiveness, only sets the initial coordinates of the real 
quest.  
     
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
forgiveness as manifestation of these characterizations see HUBERT FRANKEMÖLLE 
(ed.), Sünde und Erlösung im Neuen Testament, Freiburg 1996. 
 13 
   
  goodness, love 
     positive giving, donating 
 
 
              charisms      
              flourishing            existence in love 
and truth 
          sincere neighbourly love 
          justice and mercy 
 
 
 
forgetting                              remembering 
 
indifference to          truth 
truth 
 14 
Fig. 2: the transcendentals of truth and goodness 
 
    The moment of forgiveness and conversion leads the person towards truth or love. 
Although these two transcendentals are no opposites, they have an initial tendency to 
counteract and even reject one another, so that a person starts his or her quest either on the 
path of truth or on the path of goodness. The path of goodness and love leads towards the 
philosophical ideal of flourishing and the theological ideal of charismatic sanctification. In 
this ideal the person can affirm and enjoy his own existence and become an active subject.  
The sensitivity to objective truth may, however, remain underdeveloped; this lack may 
prevent the person from seeking justice and practising neighbourly love. 
     The other path leads towards truth without goodness and love. This path can be 
characterized as typically Lutheran, since it emphasizes the existence of the person as 
righteous and sinner. The person has sensitivity for his own sufferings and wrongdoings as 
well as for the injustices prevailing in the world. Memory of past wrongs,  renunciation of 
superficial comforts and clear recognition of today's suffering are described in terms of a 
theology of the cross. The quest for truth without love also makes the person an active 
subject who often cares for others and is sensitive to all kinds of injustice. But as the 
sensitivity towards goodness and love remains underdeveloped, the person has difficulties 
to enjoy his or her own life and transfer goodness to other people. In this sense the 
neighbourly love also remains hampered in this mode of existence.  
     The matrix shows that neither the ideal of flourishing nor the ideal of »righteous and 
sinner« can be taken as the final purpose of our existence. People who flourish still need to 
work out the objective truth and memory with all its hardships. People who practise a 
theology of the cross need to affirm the scale of goodness and love. Although the 
transcendentals of truth and love resist one another during the initial phases of the personal 
quest, they are, finally, mutually supportive in realizing the ideals of neighbourly love, 
justice and mercy. The matrix also illustrates the nature of forgiveness as the cornerstone of 
Christian existence. Forgiveness is not merely something which takes place in the realm of 
values and thoughts, but it can be connected with metaphysics and foundations of human 
existence. But forgiveness is not everything: it sets the default values of humanity through 
pointing out that a person can, paradoxically, be affirmed precisely when he or she remains 
indifferent to truth and goodness. Realizing this should lead the person to the quest for 
truth and goodness. 
     In this manner fig. 2 attempts to lay out a structure for the doctrinal narrative which 
shapes Christian theology. While this structure remains far from exhaustive, one can argue 
that the two figures, taken together, outline a fairly comprehensive picture of prominent 
doctrinal issues. While fig 1 uses the undifferentiated »give« as a starting-point and a seed 
from which a number of doctrines are cultivated, fig 2 elevates the theology of giving to a 
metaphysical level through using the concepts of truth and goodness as transcendentals of 
doctrine. Art the same time, the metaphysical outline is a narrative outline in which the 
Christian existence proceeds through several biographical stations. These stations have a 
paradigmatic value: they are not meant to depict an order of salvation, but they illustrate 
different conceptual options available in the Christian narrative. 
 
 
V. Road Maps and Comprehensive Theology 
 
A certain remaining tension between the concepts of »Lutheran doctrine« and 
»comprehensive theology« can be observed. If Lutherans want to contribute to the broader 
discussion concerning Christian doctrine, they should not remain parochial or 
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particularistic, but show how a truly catholic and apostolic theology can be grown from a 
Lutheran seed or stem cell. The end result may reveal some inherited features of the 
original seed or cell, but it should above all be capable of integrating and including diverse 
features of the entire Christianity into its consistent and understandable body of doctrine. 
Although the road map of confessional Lutheranism only contains some highways, this 
road map should be so reliable that it can be used as a basis of extensive cartographic 
developments. 
     I have argued that the theology of giving is a genuinely Lutheran theological theme 
which can provide the extensions and developments needed for a comprehensive Christian 
theology. The end result need no longer be particularly Lutheran, although it contains some 
inherited features of the Lutheran seed which has been cultivated in the rich soil in 
Christianity. This view of doctrine has something in common with the strategies of 
doctrine outlined in the beginning of the paper, especially with the second and fourth 
strategy. The road maps drawn in figs. 1 and 2 lay out a doctrinal shape in which 
distinctively Lutheran seeds of doctrine are cultivated towards a universal theology which 
includes classical elements (second strategy) and new organic developments (fourth 
strategy).  
     The strategies described in the beginning of this paper fail, however, to grasp properly 
the inherent life of doctrinal theology. Doctrines do not grow by means of logical 
deduction, philosophical elaboration or legal promulgation of new sentences. The doctrinal 
development discussed in this paper rather resembles the biological reproduction of 
missing parts: many plants, for instance, can reproduce themselves from fragments. Tiny 
animal populations are often sufficient for the new beginning and future flourishing of the 
species. Fragmentary confessions may also be sufficient for the reproduction of the whole 
body of Christian doctrine. 
